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Abstract—With the development and popularization of net-
work technology, communication using Voice over IP (VoIP) has
become an increasingly common means of information transmis-
sion in people’s daily lives. With these emerging communication
channels, more and more VoIP-based steganography methods
have appeared in recent years, which pose a great threat to the
security of cyberspace. Previous VoIP steganalysis methods face
great challenges in detecting speech signals at low embedding
rates, and they are also generally difficult to perform real-time
detection, making them hard to truly maintain cyberspace secu-
rity. To solve these two challenges, in this paper, combined with
the sliding window detection algorithm and Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN), we propose a real-time VoIP steganalysis method
which based on multi-channel convolutional sliding windows
(CSW). In order to analyze the correlations between frames and
different neighborhood frames in a VoIP signal, we define multi-
channel sliding detection windows. Within each sliding window,
we design two feature extraction channels which contain multiple
convolutional layers with multiple convolution kernels each layer
to extract correlation features of the input signal. Then based
on these extracted features, we use a forward fully connected
network for feature fusion. Finally, by analyzing the statistical
distribution of these features, the discriminator will determine
whether the input speech signal contains covert information or
not. We designed several experiments to test the proposed model’s
detection ability under various conditions, including different
embedding rates, different speech length, etc. Experimental
results showed that the proposed model outperforms all the
previous methods, especially in the case of low embedding rate,
which showed state-of-the-art performance. In addition, we also
tested the detection efficiency of the proposed model, and the
results showed that it can achieve almost real-time detection of
VoIP speech signals.
Index Terms—Voice over IP (VoIP), Steganalysis, Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN), Sliding Window, Feature Extrac-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Concealment system is one of the three basic information
security systems in cyberspace [20], its biggest characteristic
is the strong concealment of information. When the other two
information security systems, which are encryption system and
privacy system, ensure information security, they also expose
the existence and importance of information, making it more
vulnerable to be attacked by interception and cracking [28].
While for the concealment system, it uses various carriers to
embed secret information and then transmits them through
public channels, in which way the system hides the existence
of secret information to achieve the purpose of not being easily
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suspected and attacked [27]. However, strong concealment can
also be used by hackers, terrorists, and other law breakers for
malicious intentions. Hence, designing an automatic steganog-
raphy detection method becomes an increasingly promising
and challenging task.
Usually we can model a concealment system as a “Prison-
ers’ Problem” [27]. In this model, Alice needs to transmit the
secret message m, which from the secret message space M,
to Bob. Alice selects a suitable cover c from the cover space
C and embeds the secret message m into the cover c under the
guidance of the hidden key kA, which is from the key space
K. The cover c becomes a stego carrier s after embedding
the covert information m, and large number of stego carriers
constitute the hidden space S. The information embedding
process can be expressed by the embedding function f , that
is:
Emb : C × K ×M→ S, f(c, kA,m) = s. (1)
Bob needs to extract the secret message m from the received
stego carrier s under the guidance of key kB . The extraction
process can be expressed by the extraction function g, namely:
Ext : S × K →M, g(s, kB) = m. (2)
In order to ensure the concealment of secret information, it
is usually required that the elements in S and C are exactly
the same, that is S = C. But generally speaking, this mapping
function will affect the probability distributions, named PC and
PS . For Alice and Bob, their main purpose is to ensure the
successful transmission of information without arousing Eve’s
suspicion, so they need to reduce the difference in statistical
distribution of carriers before and after steganography as much
as possible, that is:
df (PC , PS) ≤ ε. (3)
While for Eve, her task is to accurately determine whether the
carrier contains hidden information, so she needs to find the
difference as much as possible in the statistical distribution of
the carrier before and after steganography.
There are various media forms of carrier that can be used for
information hiding, including image [178], audio [53], [169],
text [13], [197] and so on [179]. In recent years, with the
popularity and development of the Internet, communication
based on streaming media has been greatly developed. Stream-
ing media refers to continuous time-based media that uses
streaming technology in the Internet, such as audio, video,
or multimedia files. Voice over IP (VoIP) [47] is one of the
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2most popular streaming communication service in the Internet.
Therefore, with these emerging communication channels, more
and more VoIP-based covert communication systems have
appeared in recent years [34], [45], [46], [53], [104], [169]–
[171].
Due to the transient and real-time nature of streaming
media, steganography methods based on streaming media and
static media are very different. For example, methods based
on transform domain and spread spectrum are widely used
in static audio steganography [106], [107], however their
complexity and time consuming make them not suitable for
hiding information in streaming media. A typical streaming
media can be represented by Figure 1. Each stream media
package contains four data fields: audio and video data (which
are usually compressed and coded), IP header, UDP header,
RTP header. All of these areas can be used to embed secret
information. Therefore, the information hiding technology
based on streaming media can be roughly divided into the
following two categories: information hiding based on protocol
headers [146], [201] and information hiding based on payloads
[170], [171], [195], [198], [202], [203]. For the steganographic
methods based on protocol headers, the secret information is
mainly embedded into areas of the protocol header which are
not commonly used [201]. This type of methods is simple
and easy to implement, but such methods have a low hidden
capacity and may cause a great impact on the quality of
internet service.
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Fig. 1. A typical data structure for streaming media.
At present, information hiding based on payloads are the
most common ways for streaming media steganography [170],
[171], [195], [198], [202], [203]. They realize information
hiding by modifying redundant information of payloads in
streaming media, like speech in VoIP. Currently, according to
different communication coding standards, the steganographic
methods based on payloads in VoIP can be divided into three
big families. The first type of methods is mainly for the high-
rate Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) speech coding standard
G.711. The Least Significant Bits (LSB) algorithm is widely
used in this type of steganographic methods [198], [203].
They mainly utilize the insensitivity of the human perception
system to noise, and replace the LSB of the carrier with
the secret information to realize information embedding. The
second and third type of methods are mainly for low-bit rate
compressed speech coding standards, like G.729 and G.723.1.
The second type of methods mainly use the uncertainty of
pitch period prediction, and fine-tunes the results of the pitch
prediction to achieve the purpose of information hiding [170].
The third type of methods realize information hiding mainly
by introducing Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [202]
algorithm to segment and encode the codebook in the process
of speech quantization [171], [195]. With the popularity of
the Internet and the widespread use of VoIP, these covert
communication methods pose an increasingly serious threat
to cyberspace security. Therefore, it is of great value and
significance to study the steganalysis method of VoIP and
realize fast and high-performance detection of real-time speech
stream signals for protecting cyberspace and public security.
Compared with steganalysis methods for static carrier, the
steganalysis methods for streaming media are more demanding
and thus more challenging. Firstly, since the signal streams are
transmitted online in real time, the detection algorithm should
also be efficient enough. This involves two requirements. On
the one hand, the steganalysis model needs to be able to
perform high-performance detection on a speech signal which
is as short as possible. Therefore, once Alice and Bob are
found to be transmitting secret information, Eve can terminate
the communication within the shortest time after they establish
the communication. On the other hand, the steganalysis model
needs to have a sufficiently fast judgment ability. That is,
when inputted a speech signal, it is required to complete
the process of feature extraction, analysis and judgment in
the shortest time. Secondly, a very important characteristic
of covert communication based on VoIP is that, for both
communicator parties, the capacity of the carrier is completely
controllable and can be expanded arbitrarily. This means that
Alice and Bob can spread the secret information that needs to
be transmitted in a sufficiently long speech signal to achieve
a covert communication with low embedding rate. Therefore,
from the perspective of steganalysis, achieve high efficiency
and high performance detection of streaming media with low
embedding rate has always been an important research goal in
the field of VoIP steganalysis.
According to the different information hiding regions, ste-
ganalysis methods based on streaming media can also be
divided into two categories, which are steganalysis based on
network protocols [44] and steganalysis based on payloads [?],
[33], [35], [37]. Steganalysis based on network protocols is
relatively easier, because each area of the network protocol
is carefully designed and clearly defined, the content of
each area has obvious statistical characteristics. Once secret
information is embedded in some domains of the protocol,
the changes can be easily detected [44]. For steganalysis based
on payloads, since the corresponding steganographic methods
require modification of the carrier to embed information, it is
essentially similar to add noise to the carrier, and thus will
almost certainly affect the statistical distribution of the carrier
in some ways, making it gradually unsatisfactory with formula
(3). Therefore, the corresponding steganalysis methods usu-
ally analyze the statistical characteristics of the carrier, such
as Mel-frequency features [41], codewords correlations [?],
[193], [196] and so on [33], [35], by manual construction or
model self-learning, and analyze the difference of statistical
distribution of these features before and after steganography,
then determine whether the inputted VoIP speech contains
hidden information. These methods are usually difficult to
balance detection efficiency and detection accuracy. Some of
3them spend a large amount of time on feature extraction
and analysis in order to obtain a relatively high detection
accuracy, making them difficult to meet the real-time detection
requirements [193]. In addition, some other models may
achieve high detection performance at high embedding rate,
but when faced with VoIP speech signals with low embedding
rate, the detection performance is unsatisfactory [196].
In order to solve the two major challenges in the field of
VoIP steganalysis, namely: high performance and real-time
detection for low embedded rate speech signals, in this paper,
combined with the sliding window detection algorithm and
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we propose a real-
time VoIP steganalysis method which based on multi-channel
convolutional sliding windows (CSW). It uses multi-channel
sliding detection windows to extract correlation features be-
tween frames and different neighborhood frames in a VoIP
signal. Within each sliding window, we design two feature
extraction channels to extract both low-leavel features and
high-level features of the input signal. We disigned a large
number of experiments to verify our model in many aspects.
Experimental results showed that the proposed model outper-
forms all previous methods, especially for low-embedded VoIP
speech signals, and achieved state-of-the-art performance.
In the remainder of this paper, Section II introduces related
work, including QIM-based VoIP Steganography and Speech
Steganalysis. Section III introduces the detailed explanation of
the proposed method. The following part, Section IV presents
the experimental evaluation results and gives a comprehensive
discussion. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. QIM-based VoIP Steganography
To reduce bandwidth usage, VoIP signals are typically first
compressed at low-bit rate and then transmitted. Since speech
signals are generated by organs in respiratory tract. The organs
involved are lung, glottis, and vocal track. When passing
through glottis, the exhaled breath from lung would turn to a
periodic excitation signal. The excitation signals would then go
through vocal track. We can divide vocal track into cascaded
segments, whose functions can be modeled as one pole filters.
Low-rate speech coding standards used by VoIP such as G.729
and G.723 are based on the Linear Predictive Coding (LPC)
technique, which uses the LPC filter to analyze and synthesize
acoustic signals in the encoding and the decoding processes.
The LPC filter can be expressed as:
H(z) =
1
A(z)
=
1
1−∑ni=1 aiz−i , (4)
where ai is the (quantized) i-th order coefficient of LPC filter.
The G.729 and G.723 standards first solve the optimal
LPC prediction coefficients for each frame, and then the LPC
coefficients are converted into Line Spectrum Frequency (LSF)
coefficients. G.729 and G.723 finally use three codewords
(a1, a2, a3) to quantize the LSFs. Each codeword ai(i =
1, 2, 3) has a corresponding codebook Li(i = 1, 2, 3) whose
codeword space is {v1i , v2i , ..., v|Li|i }, where vki represents the
k-th codeword of the codebook Li, and |Li| is the number
of codewords in Li. When quantizing, they select an optimal
codeword from the codebook Li.
The Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) algorithm was
firstly proposed by Chen and Wornell et al. [202]. They hid
secret information by modifying the quantization vector in
the media encoding process, thus QIM steganography could
be conducted while quantizing LSPs. According to the basic
principle of the QIM algorithm, in the vector quantization
stage of speech coding, the codebook C is divided into N
sub-codebooks, that is
C =
N⋃
i=1
Ci,
s.t. ∀i, j ∈ [1, N ], i 6= j, Ci
⋂
Cj = ∅.
(5)
The QIM-based VoIP steganography encodes each sub-
codebook, and then the input vector can be quantized into N
different sub-codebook Ci according to the secret information.
Usually for QIM-based steganography, the maximum embed-
ding capacity is blogN2 c bits. The basic principle of QIM is
shown in Figure 2, in which the codebook is divided into four
sub-codebooks, so that each quantization can be embedded
with blog42c = 2 bits of information.
Vector
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Fig. 2. The basic principle of Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) algo-
rithm.
The key point of the QIM steganography is how to ef-
fectively divide the original codebook L into multiple sub-
codebooks. To optimize the division of codebooks, Xiao
et al. [195] proposed a Complementary Neighbor Vertices
(CNV) algorithm. This method can optimize the upper limit of
quantization distortion after embedding secret information. In
the experimental part of this paper, we mainly use the CNV-
QIM steganography algorithm as the detection target to test
the performance of the proposed method, while the proposed
method can also be directly used to detect other QIM-based
VoIP steganography methods.
B. Speech Steganalysis
There has been much effort in steganalysis of digital au-
dio [40]–[43]. The most common way is to directly extract
statistical features from the audio and conduct classification
subsequently. For example, C. Kraetzer et al. [41] analyzed
the statistical distribution of Mel-frequency features of audio.
Q. Liu et al. [43] analyzed the statistics of the high-frequency
spectrum and the Mel-cepstrum coefficients of the second
order derivative, and further in [42], they employed the Mel
Frequency Cepstrum Coefficient (MFCC) and Markov tran-
sition features from the second-order derivative of the audio
4signal. Then based on these features, these works used Support
Vector Machine (SVM) as classifier to decide whether the
inputted speech signal contains hidden information or not.
With the development of neural network technology, more
and more speech steganalysis methods based on neural net-
work have appeared in recent years. For example, C. Paulin
et al. [40] first extracted mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs) features of input audio and then used a deep belief
networks (DBN) to classify them. S. Rekik et al. [39] extracted
the Line Spectrum Frequency (LSF) features from original
audio and then used a Time Delay Neural Networks (TDNN)
to detect stego-speech. These methods are performed by
manually extracting the statistical characteristics of the speech
signals and then using the neural network models for analysis
and detection.
These above audio steganalysis algorithms are all aimed
at static audio, which can not be directly applied to VoIP
steganalysis due to the unique characteristics of VoIP speech
signals. In recent years, there have been many steganalysis
methods for VoIP speech signals. For example, the authors of
[41] and [37] thought that steganography of speech streams
may lead to low speech quality, so they used Mel-frequency
features of speech streams and SVM to determine whether
there was hidden information in speech streams. J. Dittmann
et al. [35] successfully implemented the detection of PCM
encoded speech stream steganography in the speech stream
by extracting the first-order and second-order statistics of the
speech stream. Y. Huang et al. [33] proposed a method for
detecting streaming media information hiding based on sliding
window. They sampled the speech in the window by selecting
an appropriate time window and used Regular Singular (RS)
algorithm [38] to determine if a LSB replacement had occurred
in the speech stream. S. Li et al. [196] used the Markov
model to calculate the transition probabilities between frames
and then used SVM to classify these features. Further, in
[193], they considered the transition probability in frames
and obtained a better detection effect. Recently, Z. Lin et
al. [204] proposed a method for extracting the correlation
between codewords and frames in a speech stream using a
two-layer Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) with Long Short
Time Memory (LSTM) units and then performing steganalysis.
These methods are difficult to balance the detection accuracy
and detection efficiency. Some of them spend too much time
on feature extraction and analysis to improve detection per-
formance, which reduce the detection efficiency. In addition,
some other models do not fully analyze the features in order
to improve the detection efficiency, which in turn affects the
detection performance. The proposed method will optimize
both of these aspects. In the experimental part, we will make
a detailed comparison and analysis.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The information-theoretic definition of steganographic secu-
rity starts with the basic assumption that the cover source can
be described by a probability distribution, PC , on the space
of all possible cover, C. The value PC(B) =
∫
B PC(X)dX
is the probability of selecting cover X ∈ B ⊂ C for hiding a
message. For a given stegosystem assuming on its input covers
X ∈ C, X ∼ PC and messages m ∈ M, the distribution of
stego cover is PS . Any steganalysis can be described by a map
F : Rd → {0, 1}, where F = 0 means that x is detected as
cover, while F = 1 means that x is detected as stego.
Figure 3 shows the overall framework of the proposed VoIP
steganalysis method. Our model consists of two parts. For
an inputted VoIP speech signal, our model first extracts the
speech features using multi-channel convolutional sliding win-
dows. Then, after feature fusion, the discriminator determines
whether the input speech contains concealed information by
analyzing the difference in statistical distribution of these
features.
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Fig. 3. The overall framework of the proposed VoIP steganalysis method.
A. Feature Analysis
VoIP speech signals are compressed and encoded sequence
signal, so there may have some strong signature correlations
between codewords. For an LSF-encoded speech signal which
contains N frames, we can express it as:
X = [x1, x2, ..., xN ] =
 a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,Na2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,N
a3,1 a3,2 · · · a3,N
 . (6)
Here, xi denotes the i-th frame in the speech segment, and
ai,j denotes the j-th codeword in the i-th frame. When all
cordwords are uncorrelated, their appearances are independent.
Therefore, we have
P (ai,j , ak,l) = P (ai,j) · P (ak,l),
s.t. ∀i, k ∈ [1, N ]; j, l ∈ [1, 3]. (7)
When the two sides of Equation (7) are not equal, we think
there is a correlation between the two cordwords ai,j and
ak,l. According to Equation (7), we can define two types of
codeword correlation: namely intra-frame correlation, which
can be expressed as: P (ai,j , ak,l|i = k ∈ [1, N ], j, l ∈
[1, 3]), and inter-frame correlation, which can be expressed
as: P (ai,j , ak,l|i 6= k, j, l ∈ [1, 3]). Z. Lin et al. [204]
further refines the inter-frame correlation into three categories
according to the distance between frames: Successive frame
Correlation, Cross Frame Correlation, Cross Word Correlation.
5Once we embed additional information into these voice
streams, it is possible to influence the correlations between
these cordwords and change their statistical distribution.
Therefore, some of the previous VoIP steganalysis methods
tried to extract these correlation features as a basis for
steganography judgment. For example, S. Li et al. tried to
extract the transition probability feature between inter [196]
and intra [193] codewords using the Markov model. Z. Lin et
al. [204] used a LSTM Neural Nework to extract the temporal
correlations of codewords, which achieved currently the best
detection performance.
B. Feature Extraction by Convolutional Sliding Windows
The sliding window algorithm for steganalysis of VoIP
speech signal was first proposed by Y. Huang et al. [33].
They used a fixed-length sliding window to slide over the
VoIP data stream. Whitin each each sliding window, they used
the Regular Singular (RS) algorithm [38] to extract features
and then determined if LSB steganography has occurred in
the VoIP speech segment. However, they only used a single-
channel sliding window, that is, the sliding window had a fixed
length, so it could only extract the correlations between each
frame and a fixed range of frames. In this proposed model, in
order to extract the correlations between each speech frame
and the adjacent frames at different distances, we propose a
multi-channel sliding window detection method, each channel
uses sliding window of different lengths, as shown in Figure
4.
. . .
. . .
. . .
𝐿ଵ
𝐿ଶ
𝐿ଷ
Sliding Direction
X
Fig. 4. We use a multi-channel sliding window detection method, each
channel uses sliding window of different lengths.
In the past few years, convolutional neural network has
made notable progress in fields such as computer vision [?],
[30], [81] and natural language processing [52]. The incremen-
tal advancement of CNN is likely to benefit the development
of new technology and inventions in other fields. A large
number of researches and applications have shown that the
convolutional neural network has a powerful ability in feature
extractions and expressions [?], [52], which does not require
hand-designed features but carries out self-learning through
plenty of data. Inspired by these works, in the proposed model,
for each sliding window, we design a codewords correlation
extraction method based on convolutional kernels. Inside each
sliding window, we design two feature extraction channels:
one is a convolution channel composed of two convolutional
layers to extract high-level features, and the other is a skip
channel for passing lower-level features.
Convolution operation is a feature extraction process for
the elements in the local region of the input matrix. More
Fig. 5. The details of the proposed method. For each sliding window, we
design two feature extraction channels: one is a convolution channel composed
of two convolutional layers to extract high-level features, and the other is a
skip channel for passing lower-level features. Finally, we use a forward neural
network to fuse the extracted features and finally determine whether the input
speech contains hidden information.
specifically, suppose that the width of the k-th sliding window
is Lk, then the convolution kernel of the first convolutional
layer can be expressed as W k ∈ R3×Lk , that is
W k =
 wk1,1 wk1,2 · · · wk1,Lkwk2,1 wk2,2 · · · wk2,Lk
wk3,1 w
k
3,2 · · · wk3,Lk
 . (8)
When wk1,1 and a1,1 coincide, the feature c
k
1,1 extracted from
x1:h by the convolutional kernel can be:
ck1,1 = f(
3∑
i=1
lk∑
j=1
wki,j · ai,j + bki,j), (9)
where the weight wki,j denotes the contribution of the j-th
value in the i-th frame, bki,j is the bias term and f is a nonlinear
function. Here we follow previous works [?] and use ReLu
function as our nonlinear function, which is defined as
y = ReLu(x) = max(0, x). (10)
It is worth noting that the feature ck1,1 here is only extracted
from a single convolution kernel. Previous works have shown
that different convolution kernels may extract features from
different aspects of the input signal [?]. Therefore, in order
to extract more comprehensive features of the speech signal
in the sliding window, we simultaneously use multiple convo-
lution kernels for feature extraction. Suppose the number of
convolution kernels in the first convolutional layer is u1, when
wk1,1 and a1,1 coincide, the extracted features can be expressed
as
Ck1 = [c
k
1,1, c
k
1,2, ..., c
k
1,u1 ]. (11)
In order to further extract the codeword correlation features
in different regions of the input speech signal, we slide the
k-th window from the beginning of input speech sample X to
the end of it, and calculates the features of each local region.
Therefore, after the first convolutional layer, the features we
extracted can be expressed as Ck ∈ Rlc×u1 , that is
6Ck =

ck1,1 c
k
1,2 · · · ck1,u1
ck2,1 c
k
2,2 · · · ck2,u1
...
...
. . .
...
cklc,1 c
k
lc,2
· · · cklc,u1
 , (12)
where lc represents the number of features extracted by each
convolution kernel for the input speech signal. When the
sliding step is Tc (which we usually set it to be 1), the
relationship between lc and the input signal length N is:
lc =
N − Lk + 1
Tc
. (13)
Previous work on convolutional neural networks has shown
that increasing the number of convolutional layers within a
certain range is beneficial for extracting higher-level signal
features and also for later feature analysis [81]. However,
too many layers can lead to over-fitting and reduce detection
efficiency. So we add another convolutional layer after the first
convolutional layer. The operation of the second convolutional
layer and the first convolutional layer are basically the same.
It also contains multiple convolution kernels and each has the
same width as Ck. Then these convolution kernels slid from
top to bottom and using convolution calculations to extract
high-level features. Therefore, the features extracted by the
second convolutional layer can be expressed as Ek ∈ Rle×u2 ,
that is
Ek =

ek1,1 e
k
1,2 · · · ek1,u2
ek2,1 e
k
2,2 · · · ek2,u2
...
...
. . .
...
ekle,1 e
k
le,2
· · · ekle,u2
 . (14)
Where le represents the number of features extracted by each
convolution kernel of the second layer and u2 represents the
number of convolution kernels in the second convolutional
layer.
In addition, we also think that although the convolutional
kernels extract high-level features, they ignore some details
of the original signal, which we think are useful for the final
analysis. Therefore, referring to the latest works in the field
of neural networks [144], [145], we add an additional skip
connection to pass the low-level features of the original signal.
In order to facilitate the feature fusion of the low-level features
and the high-level features extracted by the convolutional
layer, we define a skip matrix on the skip connection. The
skip matrix Sk is mainly for dimensional transformation and
simple feature extraction of the original signal, which can be
expressed as Sk ∈ Rls×3:
Sk =
 sk1,1 sk1,2 · · · sk1,Lssk2,1 sk2,2 · · · sk2,Ls
sk3,1 s
k
3,2 · · · sk3,Ls
> . (15)
Similarly, the low-level features F k of the original signal it
extracts are
F k = f(SkX + bks) (16)
where the weight bks is the bias term and f is a nonlinear
function which is also setted to be ReLu function.
Finally, in order to enhance the robustness of the model
and prevent overfitting, we add batch normalization [36] after
each layer. This component is widely used in the field of
neural networks and has been proven to effectively improve
the training and testing performance of the network.
C. Feature Fusion and Steganography Determine
The model shown in Figure 5 can extract the correlation
between each frame in the speech signal and the surrounding
frames in different ranges. On this basis, we need to fuse
the extracted features further and make steganalysis based on
the statistical characteristics of these features. Firstly, we use
the pooling layer to fuse the features extracted from multiple
convolution kernels in a single sliding channels. The pooling
layer is widely used in neural network-related models. It
can reduce the number of neural network parameters while
maintaining the overall distribution of features, which can
effectively prevent the model from over-fitting and improve
the robustness of the model [?], [84]. In the proposed model,
we conduct a max pooling operation on the feature Ek and
F k. For example, for the i-th row feature extracted in E and
F , the outputs are:
P k = [pk1 , p
k
2 , ..., p
k
le ]
>,
Qk = [qk1 , q
k
2 , ..., q
k
le ]
>,
(17)
where
pki = max(e
k
i,1, e
k
i,2, · · · eki,u2),
qki = max(s
k
i,1, s
k
i,2, · · · ski,u2).
(18)
Usually in order to preserve a richer feature distribution,
we can use k-max pooling. k-max pooling is a generalisation
of the max pooling operator, it returns the subsequence of k
maximum values in the input features, instead of the single
maximum value. An explanation of max pooling and 2-max
pooling have been shown in figure 6.
(a) max-pooling (b) 2-max pooling
Fig. 6. The explanation of max pooling and 2-max pooling.
Secondly, we need to fuse the features extracted from
different local parts of the input signal by different sliding
7windows. In order to achieve the fusion of these features, and
also to further extract the correlation between the frames in far
distance, we add a fully connected forward neural network. To
be specifically, we splice the low-level and high-level features
of different local regions extracted by a single sliding window,
that is, P k and Qk are spliced into a complete feature vector
Zk, that is:
Zk = [(P k)>; (Qk)>]>. (19)
Then we connect the features extracted by different sliding
channels and get the complete feature expression Z of the
input speech signal:
Z = [z1, z2, ..., zm] = [(Z
1)>; (Z2)>; ...; (ZM )>]>, (20)
where M is the number of channels and m is the dimension
of the merged feature Z.
Then we define a Feature Fusion Matrix W o ∈ Rm×h to
fuse the features, where h is the dimension of the fused feature
vector O = [o1, o2, ..., oh], where:
oj =
m∑
i=1
woi,j · zi + boj . (21)
We can then use the features collected in O to classify
whether the original speech signal contains secret information.
A basic idea is to calculate the linear combination of all
features. Following previous works [52], [204], we define the
Detection Weight Vector (DWV) as V with a length of h, and
the linear combination is calculated as
y˜ =
h∑
i=1
oi · vi + boi . (22)
To get normalized output between [0, 1], we send the value
through a sigmoid function S:
S(x) =
1
1 + e−x
, (23)
and the final output is
y = S(y˜) = S(
h∑
i=1
oi · vi + boi ). (24)
Finally, we can set a detection threshold (like 0.5) and then
the final detection result can be expressed as
X ∈
{
stego speech (y ≥ threshold)
cover speech (y < threshold)
(25)
To determine the parameters in the proposed model, we
follow a supervised learning framework. In the process of
training, we update network parameters by applying backprop-
agation algorithm, and the loss function of the whole network
consists of two parts, one is the error term and the other is
the regularization term, which can be described as:
LOSS = − 1
N
∑
N
ti · log(yi) + ‖W o‖2, (26)
where N is the batch size of VoIP signals. yi represents the
probability that the i-th sample is judged to contain covert
information, ti is the actual label of the i-th sample. The error
term in the loss function calculates the average cross entropy
between the predicted probability value and the real label.
We hope that through self-learning of the model, prediction
error can get smaller and smaller, that is, the prediction results
are getting closer to the real label. In order to strengthen the
regularization and prevent overfitting, we adopt the dropout
mechanism and a constraint on l2-norms of the weight vectors
during the training process. Dropout mechanism means that in
training process of deep learning network, the neural network
unit is temporarily discarded from the network, i.e. set to zero,
according to a certain probability. This mechanism has been
proved to effectively prevent neural network from overfitting,
and significantly improve the model’s performance.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we conducted several experiments and com-
pared the results with some state of the art VoIP steganalysis
methods to verify the validity of the proposed model. This
section starts with an introduction of the dataset used in this
work, followed by the structure and the hyper-parameters
of the model. Finally, we compare the performance of the
proposed model and other state-of-the-art VoIP steganalysis
models under different conditions, including different embed-
ding rates, different durations and so on.
A. Dataset Collection and Evaluation Method
We use the speech dataset1 published by Z. Lin et al. [204]
to train and test the performance of the proposed model. This
dataset contains 41 hours of Chinese speech and 72 hours of
English speech in PCM format with 16 bits per sample from
the Internet. The speech samples are from different male and
female speakers. Those speech samples make up the cover
speech dataset.
For each sample in this speech dataset, they first use the
G.729A standard to encode it and get LSF matrix. Random
01 bit stream is embedded using CNV-QIM steganography
proposed in [195], and these samples make up the stego
speeches. Embedding rate is defined as the ratio of the number
of embedded bits to the whole embedding capacity. Lower
embedding rate indicates fewer changes to the original signal
streams. When conducting a% embedding rate steganography,
we embed each frame with a% probability. In order to test the
performance of the proposed model at different embedding
rates (especially low embedding rate), we performed 10%,
20%, 30%, ..., 100% different embedding rates for the speech
samples in the dataset. In addition to embedding rate, sample
length is another factor that influences detection accuracy.
Samples in the speech dataset are cut into 0.1s, 0.2s,....,10s
clips. Segments of the same length are successive and nonover-
lapped.
For model training, we random choose 80% of samples,
which in the same language and have the same length, from
1https://github.com/fjxmlzn/RNN-SM
8cover speech and stego speech as positive samples and negative
samples respectively, and the remaining 20% for test and
validate. For example, for 0.1s clips with 1:1 ratio of cover
clips and stego clips, the training set has 2,486,708 samples
and the test set contains 155,405 clips.
In the experimental part, we mainly use Accuracy (Acc),
FP and FN to measure the detection performance of each
model. Here, Accuracy calculates the proportion of true
results (both true positives and true negatives) among the total
number of cases examined:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + FP + TN
. (27)
Where TP (True Positive) represents the number of positive
samples that are predicted to be positive by the model, FP
(False Positive) indicates the number of negative samples
predicted to be positive, FN (False Negative) illustrates the
number of positive samples predicted to be negative and TN
(True Negative) represents the number of negative samples
predicted to be negative.
B. Experimental Setting and Training Details
Almost all the parameters in the proposed model can be
obtained through training, but there are still some hyper-
parameters that need to be determined, such as the number
of channels, the number of concolutional layers, and so on.
Generally, increasing these hyper-parameters will enhance
network’ representation ability. However, it may also increase
the possibility of overfitting and reduce detection performance.
To determine these hyper-parameters, we designed multiple
sets of comparative experiments. Table I shows nine different
model settings, whose components are slightly different from
the final proposed model (model a). Figure 7 shows the
detection accuracy of these nine fine-tuning models for 10s’
samples with 10% embedding rate.
TABLE I
A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS MODEL SETTINGS.
models Model Settings
a The full proposed model.
b Remove the skip connection.
c Replace all 2-max-pooling with max pooling.
d All pooling layer use 2-max pooling.
e All pooling layer use 3-max pooling.
f Remove the First convolutional layer.
g Remove the second convolutional layer.
h Set the number of the convolutional layer to 3.
i Set the number of the convolutional layer to 4.
j Change the number of channels of the sliding window to 2.
Firstly, we can see from Figure 7 that the convolutional layer
has a very significant impact on the detection performance
of the entire model. For example, when we compare model
a with model f and g, we can see that when we delete
any convolution layer, the detection performance of the final
model is greatly reduced. But when we increase the number
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Fig. 7. The detection accuracy of various models which aim at speech signal
with 10% embedding rate and 10s length.
of layers of the convolution layer, such as the models h and i,
it also reduces the detection performance of the model. This is
consistent with our previous analysis, that is, it’s not the more
the number of convolution layers, the better the performance,
because more layers will increase the risk of over-fitting and
then lower the detection performance. Secondly, when we
compare model a and model b, we find it necessary to add
the skip connection in each sliding window. As we analyzed
in model section, the added skip connection in the sliding
window is mainly to pass some original features of the input
signal. Because we think these original features contain more
details and can be helpful for the final steganalysis, which
has been proved by the experimental results. Third, comparing
the results of model a and model j, we find that increasing
the number of channels is valuable. Because for the original
single channel sliding window detection algorithm, it can only
extract the correlation within the fixed neighborhood of each
signal frame. However, multi-channel sliding windows can
extract the correlation of different neighborhoods around each
frame. Therefore, the detection performance of multi-channel
sliding windows is better. Finally, we also compare the impact
of the pooling operation on the final performance during the
feature fusion part. Specifically, we can compare the detection
results of model a, model d and model e. Through multiple
comparison experiments, the pooling layer is finally setted as
follows: 2-max pooling at the end of convolutional layer and
1-max pooling at the end of skip connected layer.
Finally, to synthesize the performance of all aspects of the
model, the structure and hyper-parameters of the proposed
model are setted as follows. We use three detection channels
with corresponding sliding window lengths of 1, 3, and 5,
respectively. The channel with length 1 mainly extracts intra-
frame correlation, and the latter two channels mainly extract
inter-frame correlation in different neighborhoods. The first
convolutional layer in each sliding window contains 128 con-
volution kernels. The width of the second layer of convolution
kernels in three different channels is 3, 5, and 7, and each
contains 64 convolution kernels . The size of skip matrix Sk
is setted to be Sk ∈ R64×3. The dimension of the spliced
feature vector Z is 448. After the feature fusion of the fully
connected layer, the dimension of the feature vector O is 64.
During model training, in order to strengthen the regularization
and prevent overfitting, we adopt the dropout mechanism [79]
9TABLE II
FOR SPEECH WITH A LENGTH OF 10S, THE DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF EACH MODEL AT DIFFERENT EMBEDDING RATES.
Language Method Metric Embedding Rate10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
English
IDC [196]
Acc (%) 51.60 58.55 63.65 71.50 76.25 83.50 87.25 91.60 95.55 97.20
FP (%) 51.50 44.70 39.60 31.10 28.30 19.60 14.10 9.00 4.50 2.40
FN (%) 45.30 38.20 33.10 25.90 19.20 13.40 11.40 7.80 4.40 3.20
SS-QCCN [193]
Acc (%) 54.40 75.45 92.45 97.35 99.15 99.60 100.00 100.00 99.95 99.30
FP (%) 55.50 32.30 10.80 4.10 1.20 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FN (%) 35.70 16.80 4.30 1.20 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.40
RNN-SM [204]
Acc (%) 59.64 92.44 94.56 96.90 97.76 98.77 99.24 99.71 99.79 98.78
FP (%) 38.70 9.18 5.73 3.95 1.98 2.12 0.84 0.31 0.29 0.04
FN (%) 42.64 5.94 5.16 2.24 2.50 0.34 0.68 0.27 0.13 2.39
Ours
Acc (%) 83.48 94.15 97.76 99.17 99.71 99.91 99.95 99.98 100.00 99.05
FP (%) 10.50 8.49 2.94 0.30 0.25 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 1.59
FN (%) 22.54 3.21 1.54 1.36 0.33 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.31
Chinese
IDC [196]
Acc (%) 52.75 59.25 65.55 71.40 78.50 82.60 89.15 93.60 96.05 98.05
FP (%) 47.30 45.20 39.80 34.10 26.40 21.20 13.00 8.00 5.50 2.10
FN (%) 47.20 36.30 29.10 23.10 16.60 13.60 8.70 4.80 2.40 1.80
SS-QCCN [193]
Acc (%) 57.35 75.00 92.00 98.25 99.50 99.85 100.00 99.95 99.90 99.75
FP (%) 45.50 29.60 12.10 3.00 0.90 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
FN (%) 39.80 20.40 3.90 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.50
RNN-SM [204]
Acc (%) 55.14 74.19 90.12 95.24 98.05 98.25 99.09 99.51 99.76 99.55
FP (%) 71.18 33.27 10.71 6.97 2.07 1.59 0.22 0.52 0.06 0.26
FN (%) 19.87 18.66 9.05 2.60 1.83 1.91 1.61 0.45 0.43 0.66
Ours
Acc (%) 74.68 92.05 96.58 98.70 99.64 99.87 99.94 99.98 100.00 99.51
FP (%) 15.21 13.28 1.12 1.57 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07
FN (%) 35.43 2.62 5.72 1.03 0.67 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.91
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Fig. 8. For a speech with a length of 10s, the detection accuracy of each model varies with the embedding rate.
during the training process. We choose Adam [164] as the
optimization method. The learning rates are initially set as
0.001 and batch size is set as 256, dropout rate is 0.5.
C. Evaluation Results and Discussion
In order to objectively reflect the performance of the pro-
posed model, in this section, we choose three state-of-the-
art VoIP steganalysis algorithms which are: IDC [196] and
SS-QCCN [193] and RNN-SM [204] as our baselines. IDC
proposed in [196] extracted the transition probability between
codewords in inter frames. SS-QCCN [193] further took the
transition probability in intra frames into consideration. Both
of these two models used SVM as classifier. RNN-SM [204]
used a 2-layer Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) with Long
Short Time Memory (LSTM) units to extract the codeword
correlation features in VoIP streams and then used a feature
classification model to classify those correlation features into
cover speech and stego speech categories.
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Fig. 9. The distribution of speech features extracted by the proposed model in statistical space varies with the embedding rate. Each of the dots represents a
speech with a length of 10s, the blue points indicate cover speeches, and the green points indicate stego speeches with different embedding rate concealment
information. We can clearly see that as the embedding rate increases, these speech features gradually separate in the statistical space. When the embedding
rate is greater than 40%, the boundary can be clearly seen from the feature space.
1) Performance Under Different Embedding Rates: Em-
bedding rate (ER) is defined as the ratio of the number of
embedded bits to the whole embedding capacity. In general,
when the embedding rate is small, the statistical distribution of
the carrier before and after steganography is small, making it
easier to satisfy formula (3) and more difficult to be detected.
In reality, Alice and Bob may spread the secret information
over a long time frame to embed, thus reducing the average
embedding rate of information to ensure the concealment of
their communication. Therefore, effective steganographic de-
tection of VoIP speech signals at low embedding rates has long
been a very challenging but also very realistic research goal.
We tested the detection performance of each model at different
embedding rates when the length of the speech samples is 10s
and the results are shown in Table 2. According to the results
in Table 2, we can draw the following conclusions. Firstly,
as the embedding rate increases, the detection accuracy of
each models increase, which is consistent with our previous
analysis. In order to visually reflect this situation, we plot the
detection accuracy of each model at different embedding rates,
as shown in Figure 8. Compared to other VoIP steganalysis
methods, the proposed models has achieved the best detection
performance in most cases, including different language and
different embedding rates.
Secondly, we find that when the embedding rate is relatively
high (for example, 80%), existing models can basically detect
the steganography of VoIP speech signals effectively, and the
accuracy rate can reach more than 90%. However, when the
embedding rate is very low, such as only 10%, existing models
show unsatisfactory detection performance, and the proposed
model shows great advantages over other models (English:
Ours (83.48%) VS RNN-SM [204] (59.64%), Chinese: Ours
(77.18%) VS RNN-SM [204] (59.14%)). These results prove
that the proposed model can extract the statistical distribution
difference of VoIP speech signal features before and after
steganography more effectively than other methods. Even
when the embedding rate is very low and the difference
of statistical features is not obvious, we can still detect
with high accuracy. We use t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor
Embedding (t-SNE) [123] technology to reduce and visualize
the VoIP speech signal features (vector O in Equation (21))
extracted by the proposed model. The results are shown in
Figure 9. In Figure 9, each point represents an input VoIP
speech signal, the blue points indicate cover speeches, and
the green points indicate stego points. From Fig. 9, we can
find that when the embedding rate is only 10%, the cover
speech and the stego speech have a large overlapping area in
the feature space, which makes steganalysis models difficult to
distinguish them. However, as the embedding rate increases,
the distribution of the cover speech and the stego speech in the
feature space is gradually separated. When the embedding rate
is greater than 40%, the boundary can be clearly seen from
the feature space. The results in Figure 9 intuitively reflect the
proposed model’s ability to extract and analyze the features of
steganographic speech at different embedding rates.
Thirdly, from Table 2, we also notice that, in most of the
cases, the accuracy of English speeches are higher than that of
Chinese speech samples when they have the same embedding
rate. This phenomenon may be explained by the different
characteristics of the two languages. English is composed by
20 vowels and 28 consonants. However, in Chinese, there are
412 kinds of syllables. The diversity makes the correlations
between codewords in Chinese more complicated, and it is
therefore more difficult to perform steganographic detection.
2) Performance Under Different Clip Length: Compared
with the steganalysis methods based on static carrier, since
VoIP speech signals are transmitted online in real time, we
usually require VoIP steganalysis to achieve sufficiently high
detection accuracy in a short enough time. Therefore, we
tested the performance of each model for different speech
11
TABLE III
WHEN THE EMBEDDING RATE IS 100%, THE DETECTION RESULTS OF EACH MODEL UNDER DIFFERENT SPEECH LENGTH.
Language Method Metric Sample Length (s)0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
English
IDC [196]
Acc (%) 85.40 88.00 88.50 89.25 90.10 91.45 91.40 92.40 92.95 93.70
FP (%) 14.60 11.40 10.70 11.60 8.90 8.00 8.30 8.60 7.60 6.10
FN (%) 14.60 12.60 12.30 9.90 10.90 9.10 8.90 6.60 6.50 6.50
SS-QCCN [193]
ACC (%) 82.00 88.85 92.15 95.00 95.70 96.15 96.25 96.90 96.90 98.00
FP (%) 8.00 8.90 5.80 4.60 4.20 2.90 3.70 1.80 1.70 0.60
FN (%) 28.00 13.40 9.90 5.40 4.40 4.80 3.80 4.40 4.50 3.40
RNN-SM [204]
ACC (%) 90.40 95.50 97.38 97.81 98.16 98.23 98.38 98.48 98.49 98.54
FP (%) 10.02 4.66 2.46 1.77 1.57 1.76 1.06 1.04 0.85 0.81
FN (%) 8.16 3.53 3.48 2.80 2.24 2.01 1.91 1.59 1.04 1.47
Ours
ACC (%) 91.59 95.63 97.40 97.85 98.21 98.36 98.40 98.43 98.49 98.47
FP (%) 2.06 1.39 3.71 2.08 1.83 2.29 2.37 2.98 2.42 0.33
FN (%) 14.76 7.35 1.49 2.22 1.75 0.99 0.83 0.16 0.60 2.73
Chinese
IDC [196]
ACC (%) 86.80 88.65 90.20 90.50 91.20 92.25 93.10 94.25 94.70 94.05
FP (%) 13.60 11.40 9.40 9.30 9.90 7.80 6.70 6.70 6.10 7.10
FN (%) 12.80 11.30 10.20 9.70 7.70 7.70 7.10 4.80 4.50 4.80
SS-QCCN [193]
ACC (%) 81.20 90.05 93.75 95.25 96.50 97.45 97.60 98.30 98.10 98.50
FP (%) 9.50 8.30 7.10 4.80 3.40 1.90 2.70 1.80 1.40 0.90
FN (%) 28.10 11.60 5.40 4.70 3.60 3.20 2.10 1.60 2.40 2.10
RNN-SM [204]
ACC (%) 90.91 95.91 97.03 97.72 98.09 98.12 98.51 98.69 99.06 98.86
FP (%) 10.02 4.66 2.46 1.77 1.57 1.76 1.06 1.04 0.85 0.81
FN (%) 8.16 3.53 3.48 2.80 2.24 2.01 1.91 1.59 1.04 1.47
Ours
ACC (%) 91.84 96.12 97.70 98.32 98.56 98.40 98.99 98.80 99.13 98.95
FP (%) 7.25 2.79 2.50 0.95 3.43 1.88 0.98 1.97 0.94 0.33
FN (%) 9.07 4.97 2.10 2.41 0.00 1.32 1.04 0.43 0.80 1.77
lengths. Table 3 shows the detection performance of each
model for different length speeches when the embedding
rate is 100%. From the results in Table 3, firstly, we notice
that as the length of speech changes from short to long,
the detection accuracy of each model is gradually improved.
The reason might be that there are codeword correlations
between various distance frames in the speech signal. In
general, the correlations between nearer frames are stronger
than the correlations between distant frames. Therefore, once
the covert information is embedded in the speech signal, it
first effects the correlations between the distant frames, and
which are easier to be found in the longer speech signal. The
shorter speech signals have stronger codeword correlations
and are less likely to be corrupted by the embedded secret
information, so they are more difficult to detect. Secondly, the
experimental results also show that the detection performance
of the proposed model is superior to other models for most
cases. In particular, when the length is short, for example,
only 0.1 seconds, the proposed method can achieve 91.59%
(English) and 91.84% (Chinese) of the detection accuracy and
exceed all previous models. This means that if Alice and Bob
are making covert communication using VoIP, Eve can have
more than 91% confidence in whether they are transmitting
secret information within 0.1 second after their call start. This
will further enhance Eve’s maintenance of network security,
which has very important practical significance.
Combining the previous two experiments, we further tested
the performance of each model in terms of short durations
and low embedding rates. Table 4 lists the detection results of
each method when clip length are 0.1s, 0.3s, 0.5s and 1s and
embedding rate ranges from 10% to 40%. From Table 4 we
can get the same conclusions with the previous two sets of
experiments, that is, as the embedding rate and speech length
increase, the detection performance of each model gradually
increases. At the same time, we also notice that effective
steganalysis for the VoIP speech signals with an extremely
short length (less than 1 second) and low embedding rate
(less than 30%) are still very challenging. Nevertheless, our
method has made remarkable progress compared with the
previous methods and we think it has very important value
and significance.
3) Time Efficiency in Different Clips: As we have analyzed
before, VoIP speech signals are transmitted online in real time.
Therefore, we usually require the VoIP Steganography analysis
model to be efficient enough to meet real-time requirements.
In the previous experiments, we tested the performance of
each model for different speech signal lengths (Table 3).
Here we further test the detection efficiency of the proposed
model. Both IDC [196] and SS-QCCN [193] depend on SVM
algorithm and they take too much time to extract features from
the VoIP speech stream. Therefore, they are not suitable for
online real-time detection. The RNN-SM model proposed by
Z. Lin et al. [204] also has the ability for fast detection of
VoIP tream, and both RNN-SM and our model are based on
neural network models, thus we mainly compare the efficiency
of our model with RNN-SM model. We tested the detection
efficiency of these two models for different lengths of speech
in the same environment. The results are shown in Table 5
and Figure 10.
As can be seen from Table 5 and Figure 10, firstly, as the
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TABLE IV
THE DETECTION ACCURACY OF EACH MODEL FOR A SPEECH SIGNAL
WITH A SHORT LENGTH AND A LOW EMBEDDING RATE.
length language Method Embedding Rate10% 20% 30% 40%
0.1s
EN
IDC [196] 52.95 57.65 62.90 67.05
SS-QCCN [193] 50.55 54.80 58.25 59.05
RNN-SM [204] 55.39 60.25 67.43 70.28
Ours 55.99 62.44 67.58 72.36
CN
IDC [196] 53.90 58.85 63.70 68.05
SS-QCCN [193] 51.55 54.80 58.25 59.05
RNN-SM [204] 54.71 60.48 63.60 68.18
Ours 55.20 61.71 67.15 72.04
0.3s
EN
IDC [196] 54.55 58.15 63.65 69.50
SS-QCCN [193] 53.15 58.25 62.90 71.45
RNN-SM [204] 59.68 70.05 77.17 77.27
Ours 61.23 70.61 78.21 84.43
CN
IDC [196] 54.50 60.10 65.70 70.05
SS-QCCN [193] 53.15 58.25 62.90 71.45
RNN-SM [204] 57.61 66.81 74.60 80.08
Ours 59.66 70.02 77.87 82.75
0.5s
EN
IDC [196] 52.00 60.05 64.00 69.20
SS-QCCN [193] 54.00 60.95 67.00 75.15
RNN-SM [204] 62.00 73.49 80.00 87.98
Ours 64.33 75.72 83.80 89.49
CN
IDC [196] 57.00 60.00 65.00 71.30
SS-QCCN [193] 54.00 62.00 67.00 75.65
RNN-SM [204] 71.00 71.00 78.00 85.75
Ours 69.45 80.21 82.19 86.83
1.0s
EN
IDC [196] 57.00 65.00 72.00 78.00
SS-QCCN [193] 55.00 64.00 73.00 82.00
RNN-SM [204] 68.00 69.00 86.00 91.00
Ours 69.09 81.36 88.91 93.18
CN
IDC [196] 55.00 64.00 69.00 77.00
SS-QCCN [193] 55.00 64.00 73.00 82.00
RNN-SM [204] 62.00 75.00 84.00 89.00
Ours 66.21 78.94 87.20 92.41
length of the speech increases, the detection time required for
both models increases almost linearly. Secondly, we also note
that the detection time of our model increases with the sample
length at a much slower rate than that of RNN-SM model. For
example, when the sample length is only 0.1 seconds, there are
little difference in detection time between these two models
(Ours: 0.519±0.147 (ms) VS RNN-SM [204]: 0.591±0.125
(ms)). When the sample length increases to 10 seconds, the
detection time required by RNN-SM is more than 13 times that
of the proposed model (Ours: 2.876±0.784 (ms) VS RNN-
SM [204]: 38.645±3.595 (ms)). This is because the RNN-
SM model uses a frame-by-frame iterative calculation when
extracting inter-frame correlation features. In our model, we
extract correlation features of all frames in a sliding window
at one time, so the time cost is shorter. This part of the
experiment further proves the high efficiency of the proposed
model and enables almost real-time steganalysis and detection
of VoIP voice signals, which has strong practical significance.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to solve the two major challenges in the field of
VoIP steganalysis, namely: high performance and real-time
detection for low embedded rate speech signals, in this paper,
combined with the sliding window detection algorithm and
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we propose a real-
time VoIP steganalysis method which based on multi-channel
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Fig. 10. The detection time cost by each model varies with the length of the
speech.
convolutional sliding windows (CSW). It uses multi-channel
sliding detection windows to extract correlations features be-
tween frames and different neighborhood frames in a VoIP
signal. Within each sliding window, we design two feature
extraction channels to extract both low-leavel features and
high-level features of the input signal. We used a large number
of experiments to verify our model in many aspects. Experi-
mental results show that the proposed model outperforms all
the previous methods, especially in the case of low embedding
rate, which shows state-of-the-art performance. In addition, we
also tested the detection efficiency of the proposed model, and
the results show that it can achieve almost real-time detection
of VoIP speech signals. We hope that this paper will serve as
a reference guide for researchers to facilitate the design and
implementation of better VoIP steganalysis.
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